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Abstract In this paper, we use the largest exchange rate survey in Colombia to test
for the rational expectations hypothesis, the presence of a time-varying risk pre-
mium and the accuracy of exchange rate forecasts. Our findings indicate that epi-
sodes of exchange rate appreciation preceded expectations of further appreciation in
the short run, but were marked by depreciations in the long run. This reversal largely
explains the stabilizing pattern of expectations. Additionally, we find that the for-
ward discount differed from future exchange rate changes due to the rejection of the
unbiasedness condition and to the presence of a time-varying risk premium. Finally,
we find that only short run expectations were able to outperform a random walk
process as well as models of extrapolative, adaptive, and regressive expectations.
Long-run expectations, on the other hand, behaved poorly in terms of forecasting
accuracy.
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1 Introduction
The total currency turnover in global financial markets has dramatically increased
since the end of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s. In fact, progressive
financial innovation and deregulation have induced foreign exchange trading to
exceed, by almost 20-fold, the volume of goods and services worldwide.1 According
to Jongen et al. (2008), ‘‘It therefore seems that the foreign exchange market is a
market ‘on its own’ and that this market, because of its large volume, is highly
liquid and efficient.’’2 As such, there has been a longstanding debate in the
international finance literature on the main factors driving these capital flows.
Nonetheless, most of the works agree that expectations play a central role in the
determination of the exchange rate and for some authors, little else matters (see
Woodford and Walsh (2005)).
Exchange rate expectations are generally assumed to be unbiased, homogeneous,
and stabilizing. In many occasions, expectations are also assumed to be risk neutral,
which overlooks potential effects brought forth by a time-varying risk premium.
Namely, models that incorporate no-arbitrage conditions (such as the uncovered
interest rate parity) assume that different currency-denominated assets are perfect
substitutes.3 Consequently, the validity of results largely depends on the accuracy of
these assumptions.
Paradoxically, the empirical literature has shown again and again that these
assumptions do not hold. In fact, there is a long history of evidence pioneered by
Frankel (1979), Dominguez (1986), and Frankel and Froot (1987) and by more
recent works of De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) and De Grauwe and Markiewicz
(2013) that show a systematic bias in exchange rate expectations. In addition, Ito
(1990) and Allen and Taylor (1990) find empirical evidence of strong heterogeneity
in expectations among market participants.4
There are also numerous studies such as Lewis (1995), Bekaert (1996), Mark and
Wu (1998), Carlson (1998), and Meredith and Ma (2002) that find statistical
evidence of a currency risk premium. Authors such as Nurkse (1944), Takagi
(1991), and Frankel and Rose (1994) consider expectations to be highly volatile and
unstable, and state that the influence of psychological factors may at times be
overwhelming. They claim that the destabilizing pattern of expectations (commonly
known as ‘‘bandwagon expectations’’) produce extremely volatile exchange rates
which negatively affect investment and international trade, increase protectionist
pressures, and hinder the development of the financial sector.
Notwithstanding, central banks still maintain a high degree of credibility on
exchange rate surveys and often use them as input for their own internal forecasts.5
They generally argue that the use of ex-post exchange rates as a proxy for
1 See the 2013 Triennial Central Bank Survey of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).
2 Jongen et al. (2008), page 1.
3 See Villamizar-Villegas and Perez-Reyna (2015).
4 Ito (1990) uses biweekly panel data collected by the Japan Center for International Finance. It includes
44 financial institutions. Allen and Taylor (1990) use data from the foreign exchange market in London.
5 See Villamizar-Villegas (2015).
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expectations has the disadvantage of assuming rational expectations instead of
testing them, that is, studies that employ observed ex-post exchange rates cannot
fully determine whether the evidence of a risk premium is in fact attributed to a
time-varying risk or to the failure of rational expectations.
In this paper, we use a novel (and proprietary) survey conducted monthly by the
Central Bank of Colombia during October 2003–August 2012 to test for the rational
expectations hypothesis, the presence of a time-varying risk premium, and the
accuracy of exchange rate forecasts. Our dataset (monthly frequency) is by far the
largest official exchange rate survey in the country, containing a comprehensive
outlook of the financial sector, with responses from nearly all pension funds,
stockbrokers, and commercial banks, and while assumptions on exchange rate
dynamics have been widely researched in the literature, to our knowledge there is no
study applied to the Colombian case. Consequently, we shed light on the validity of
several economic assumptions that relate to the nature of exchange rate behavior,
using detailed and real-time data on traders, analysts, and market makers.
Our main findings indicate that episodes of exchange rate appreciation preceded
expectations of further appreciation in the short run, but were marked by
depreciations in the long run. In the related literature, this pattern has been referred
to as an expectational twist and partially explains the stabilizing nature of
expectations. For example, as explained in Jongen et al. (2008), market participants
might be reacting to momentum models in the short run (i.e., chartists), while
making use of equilibrium models supported by macroeconomic fundamentals in
the long run (i.e., fundamentalists). Additionally, we find that the forward discount
differed from future exchange rate changes due to a significant time-varying risk
premium, and that both the unbiasedness and orthogonality conditions are rejected
for all horizons considered. In line with most of the existing literature, these results
constitute ample evidence against the efficient market hypothesis (EMH).
Finally, we set forth five competing strategies to assess how well actual
expectations performed, relative to a random walk process. We find that 1-month
expectations outperform a random walk process as well as models of extrapolative,
adaptive, and regressive expectations. But results are almost the opposite for 1-year
forecasts, where expectations do not outperform a random walk. In this last case,
traders and analysts answering the survey could have improved their forecasts by
incorporating information from the forward discount, past exchange rate changes,
policy meetings, or the policy rate.
This paper is organized as follows. Sect. 2 describes the data and investigates the
incidence and potential attrition bias due to the number of non-responses within our
unbalanced panel. Section 3 reviews the accuracy of forecasts and the relative
importance of rational expectations within the purview of the forward premium
puzzle. Section 4 presents different models of how expectations are formed and
determines their stabilizing or destabilizing nature. This section also compares
agents’ forecasting accuracy with that of a random walk. Finally, Sect. 5 concludes.




Survey data have been widely used in the international finance literature. Examples
include interest rate surveys to test for term premia as well as surveys containing
stock market rates, GNP deflators, and money aggregates.6 Additionally, survey
data on exchange rates have been widely used to test for rationality and the presence
of a risk premium without having to depend on forward rates or ex-post values of
exchange rates.
There are, however, obvious drawbacks of using survey data. For one, there is no
guarantee that agents will disclose their true beliefs. As mentioned by Frankel and
Froot (1987), ‘‘It is a cornerstone of positive economics that we learn more by
observing what people do in the marketplace than what they say’’.7 In addition, the
timing of the forecast report might not coincide with the closing of the exchange
rate market, which might give some agents additional hours of information in their
predictions. Finally, there can be wide dispersion in the answers provided by market
participants. Nevertheless, exchange rate surveys can be less problematic than other
surveys (i.e., GDP, prices, etc.) since investors or analysts responding to the survey
are actively involved in foreign exchange trading. They at least represent a clear
improvement on the conventional methodology of assuming ex-post exchange rates
as a proxy for exchange rate expectations.
In the exercises that follow, we use the Central Bank Expectations Survey
conducted monthly by the Central Bank of Colombia during October 2003–August
2012.8 Specifically, the survey asks for the 1-month, end-of-year and 1-year ahead
exchange rate forecasts; where the exchange rate is denoted in units of Colombian
pesos per US dollar (COP/USD). In total, 90 surveyed financial institutions were
classified into three groups/types: (1) Commercial Banks (median of 15 responses
per month out of 34), (2) Stockbrokers (median of 19 responses per month out of 44)
and (3) Pension Funds (median of 5 responses per month out of 12). As depicted in
Fig. 1, the number of non-responses among surveyed institutions remained
stable across time and across each type of institution. Further analysis on attrition
is conducted in the following section.
Descriptive statistics for the overall, between, and within variation of forecasts,
forecast errors and number of non-responses (i.e., attrition) are reported in Table 1.
As shown, the mean exchange rate for 1-month ahead forecasts ($2,140 COP/USD)
as well as the between and within variation ($267 and $274, respectively) are much
lower than for the 1-year ahead forecasts (with a mean of $2,255 COP/USD and
between and within variation of $318 and $329, respectively). The attrition dummy
6 See Jongen et al. (2008) for a more in-depth literature review.
7 Frankel and Froot (1987), p. 134.
8 Our sample period coincides with an inflation-targeting regime adopted by the Central Bank of
Colombia in 1999 after the strongest crisis of its history. Prior to this date, pre-announced exchange rate
bands were established, dating back to 1994. Access to aggregate data can be obtained in the central
bank’s website: http://www.banrep.gov.co.
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Fig. 1 Patterns of response and non-response
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shows an overall mean of non-responses of 57 %, with a similar variation across
time and across financial institutions (30 % and 39 %, respectively). Finally, 1-year
ahead forecast errors are large (overall mean of 9.06 %) compared to the 1-month
ahead forecast errors (overall mean of -0.27 %).
2.2 Non-response incidence and potential attrition bias
Sample attrition can lead to biased estimates when conducting causal inference,
especially when observations are not missing at random (RAM). However, when
non-responses are assumed to be MAR, the attrition bias disappears albeit with an
effective reduction in sample size.
We follow the framework presented by Fitzgerald et al. (1998) and Cheng and
Trivedi (2015) to test for attrition bias.9 Specifically, we investigate whether
variables that affect attrition are also correlated with outcome variables of interest
such as the 1-month and 1-year ahead forecasts. Formally, let the attrition function,
Ait, be an indicator function that takes the value of unity whenever a financial
institution does not respond to the survey in period t, provided that it responded to
the survey in period t  1:
Ait  ½Ait [ 0 j xit; Ait1 ¼
1 ifAit[ 0
0 ifAit  0

ð1Þ
Table 1 Overall, between, and within variation of selected variables
Variable Mean St. dev Min Max Observations
1-Month forecasts Overall 2140 319 1600 2982 N = 4100
Between 267 1756 2878 n = 90
Within 274 1593 3047 T = 45.6
1-Year forecasts Overall 2255 389 1150 3425 N = 3478
Between 318 1761 3063 n = 90
Within 329 1144 3398 T = 38.6
Attrition dummy Overall 0.57 0.49 0 1 N = 9630
Between 0.30 0.02 0.98 n = 90
Within 0.39 -0.41 1.56 T = 107
1-Month forecast errors Overall -0.27 % 3.71 % -17.1 % 16.8 % N = 4063
Between 0.86 % -3.05 % 1.64 % n = 90
Within 3.67 % -16.1 % 17.4 % T = 45.1
1-Year forecast errors Overall 9.06 % 12.6 % -79.9 % 42.3 % N = 3090
Between 6.27 % -15.4 % 25.3 % n = 89
Within 12.0 % -80.4 % 41.1 % T = 34.7
Source: authors’ calculations
9 Additional tests such as the BGLW test, found in Becketti et al. (1985), have a similar structure but
assume that attritioners exit the survey ‘‘once and for all’’. This assumption does not apply to our case
since, as shown in Table 2, respondents exit and enter the survey multiple times.
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where xit is a set of control variables observed in period t. The latent attrition








2itb2 þ ai þ e2it; ð3Þ
where z1it and z2it consist of time-varying and time-invariant covariates in the








It follows that if residuals of Eqs. (2) and (3) are uncorrelated, then the attrition
function and outcome variable are conditionally independent. In other words, the
pair ðAit; yitÞ will be uncorrelated conditional on xit; z1it; and ai. This framework fits
well under the sample selection (Heckman correction) specification introduced by
Heckman (1979).
Consequently, to test for attrition bias we first estimate a probit regression model
(Eq. (2)), and test whether institution-specific variables such as past expected
depreciation (surveyed answers from the previous month) or the financial type
(bank, stockbroker or pension fund) had a significant effect on attrition. We also
consider common variables (across entities) such as past exchange rate depreciation,
episodes of capital controls, the forward discount, and the emerging market bond
index (EMBI).10 Finally, we include the central bank’s policy rate, board meetings,
and exchange rate equilibrium forecasts.
Results are reported in Table 3 and suggest no evidence of attrition bias (i.e., no
variable has a significant impact on attrition). In addition, the low value of the
Table 2 Patterns of non-
response
Source: authors’ calculations.
Results are based on 90 financial
institutions surveyed during Oct
2003–Aug 2012











10 Capital controls on inflows were enacted between May 7, 2007 and October 8, 2008 and consisted of
compulsory unremunerated reserve requirements. Namely, market participants were required to deposit
40 % of inflows at the central bank during a period of 6 months without interest payments [see Echavarrı´a
et al. (2013)].
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regression’s overall fit (Pseudo R2 of 0.23 %) suggests an absence of systematic
responses of these variables on non-responses.
Finally, we estimate the attrition hazard (i.e., inverse mills ratio), defined as the
conditional mean of the outcome equation’s residual; that is, we estimate E½e2;it j
e1;it ¼ r12kitðx0itcÞ and use it as covariate for all panel regressions presented in
Tables 4-5.11 In all cases, kit is not statistically significant, which provides further
support of MAR observations within non-responses.
3 Forecasts, forwards and the risk premium
3.1 How accurate are agents’ forecasts?
It appears as an empirical regularity in the literature that the expected exchange rate
does not equal the observed future rate, often missing the direction of change. For
Table 3 Attrition probit regression Source: authors’ calculations
Variable
Past expected depreciation Et½DSi;tk, k = 1 month -0.61 (2.228)
Past expected depreciation Et½DSi;tk, k = 1 year -0.14 (0.930)
Financial type: banks, stock brokers, pension funds 0.04 (0.085)
Episode of capital controls (D20072008) -0.05 (0.248)
Central bank’s policy rate 0.015 (0.049)
Board meeting dates -0.06 (0.111)
Forward discount (Ftþkt  St) -4.81 (6.136)
Exchange rate equilibrium forecast 0.41 (1.457)
Emerging market bond index (Embi) -0.00 (0.001)
Dependent variable is the attrition function indicator (with a value of unity for missing values). Values
correspond to Probit coefficients, not marginal effects. Pseudo R2 ¼ 0:0023. Total number of observa-
tions: 755. Constant not reported
***, **, * correspond to significance levels of 1, 5 and 10 %, respectively
Table 4 Accuracy of 1-month and 1-year forecasts
Institution Median Direction DSi;tþk þ= 50 pesos Direction
DSi;tþk
þ= 50 pesos
k = 1 month (%) k = 1 month (%) k = 1 year (%) k = 1 year (%)
Commercial
banks
15 66 64 35 9
Stock brokers 19 65 61 43 15
Pension funds 5 65 66 49 20
Source: authors’ calculations
11 Note that r12 corresponds to the covariance between 1it and 2it . In addition, kðÞ ¼ /ðÞUðÞ, where / and
U denote the pdf and cdf of a standard normal distribution, respectively.
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example, Wakita (1989) and Ito (1990) find industry-specific bias in expectations. In
addition, Mussa (1979) and Frankel and Froot (1987) find constant under-
predictions of exchange rate forecasts. Lewis (1995) finds evidence of systematic
forecast errors.
Figure 2 presents the 1-month (short run) and 1-year ahead (long run) average
expected exchange rate during 2003–2012. As observed, episodes of exchange rate
appreciation were generally followed by expectations of further appreciation in the
short run, and by expectations of depreciation (reversals) in the long run. This twist
in expectations partially explains the stabilizing nature of expectations that we find
in Sect. 4. It also explains why many Colombian exporters were reluctant to hedge
their operations in the forward exchange market.
This pattern is similar to the one found in Takagi (1991), for the yen–dollar
exchange rate during 1985–1986. However, Fig. 2 shows that circumstances
changed in 2011 and 2012 when the financial sector expected that the 1-year ahead
exchange rate would remain constant or even appreciate. Figure 2 also exhibits
some degree of short-term under-prediction for the 1-month ahead exchange rate, in
the sense that expected appreciations were lesser in magnitude than observed
appreciations (and vice versa for depreciations). Finally, the figure suggests that
forecasts followed a similar pattern during the period in which Colombia enacted
capital controls (May 2007–October 2008).
Expectations considered over the sample period behaved poorly in terms of
accuracy. Figure 3 presents forecast errors for 1-month and 1-year ahead
expectations, measured as the difference between the expected and observed future
rate. As can be observed, 1-month forecast errors oscillated between negative and
positive values, while the 1-year forecast errors were, for the most part, positive.12















2003 (Oct–Dec) 0.2 -1.3 0.7 0.8 -0.6
2004 0.4 -1.2 1.2 0.4 0.0
2005 0.0 -0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0
2006 -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 0.2 -0.5
2007 0.1 -0.9 0.5 0.5 -0.4
2008 0.1 0.9 -2.0 1.2 -1.1
2009 -0.2 -0.8 -0.6 1.2 -1.4
2010 -0.4 -0.5 -0.2 0.4 -0.8
2011 -0.1 0.1 -0.8 0.6 -0.7
2012 (Jan–Aug) -0.1 -1.2 0.2 0.8 -0.9
Average 0.0 -0.5 -0.1 0.6 -0.6
Source: Central Bank Data and author’s calculations (mean values)
12 Expectations differed from the observed 1-month and 1-year ahead rate in up to 206 pesos/dollar
(September 2007) and in up to 615 pesos/dollar (June 2007), respectively.
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The fact that yearly forecast errors were generally positive indicates, once again, a
systematic bias towards expected depreciations. Finally, the figure shows that
expectations behaved similarly across the different types of financial institutions.
Figure 4 shows the percentage of establishments that correctly predicted the
exchange rate direction (i.e., a positive or negative variation). Again, there are
marked differences between short- and long-term expectations. Financial institu-
tions were able to correctly predict the direction of the exchange rate in 66 % of
cases for the 1-month horizon, but only in 40 % of cases for the 1-year horizon (i.e.,
a fair coin would have outperformed the 1-year forecasts, invoking any law of large
numbers). Levels of accuracy were particularly low in 2004 and high during
episodes of steady appreciation (Jan 2005–Apr 2006, Nov 2007–Jun 2008).
Similarly, Fig. 5 depicts forecast errors larger than $100 Pesos (± 50 pesos / dollar)
and shows that in many months, not a single entity was able to predict the 1-year
ahead rate within that range.
The information contained in Figs. 4 and 5 is further sub-categorized in Table 6,
by type of financial institution. As noted, 1-month ahead forecasts (columns 3 and 4)
are similar across banks, stockbrokers and pension funds. This is not the case for the
1-year ahead forecasts (columns 5 and 6), where pension funds show a better
forecasting accuracy.
3.2 The forward discount and the risk premium
Forward exchange rates have been widely used in the literature, not only to test for
the covered interest rate parity, but also to test for the effectiveness of sterilized
foreign exchange intervention or the existence (or absence) of a risk premium. For
Fig. 2 Twist in Exchange Rate Expectations
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the case of Colombia, Echavarrı´a et al. (2008) show that the covered interest rate
parity condition holds (on average) for all horizons considered, a result that is
consistent with most of the international literature.
Fig. 3 Forecast errors
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Fig. 4 Percentage of institutions with correct exchange rate change direction
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Fig. 5 % of Institutions falling within correct range of ±50 Pesos
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Equations (5) and (6) show the covered and uncovered interest rate parity
conditions, respectively, as presented in MacDonald and Taylor (1992), McCallum
(1994), or Chinn (2007):
Ftþkt  St ¼ it  it ð5Þ
Et½DStþk ¼ it  it  rpt; ð6Þ
where Ftþkt is the log forward exchange rate (to be exercised in period t þ k), St is
the log spot exchange rate at time t, Et is the expected value operator, and it and i

t
correspond to the domestic and foreign interest rates, respectively. By substituting
Eq. (5) in 6, we obtain:
Ftþkt  St ¼Et½DStþk þ rpt
¼ðEt½Stþk  StþkÞ þ DStþk þ rpt;
ð7Þ
where the forward discount ðFtþkt  StÞ can be expressed in terms of the expected
depreciation Et½DStþk and the risk premium ðrptÞ. The second step of equation (7)
also suggests that the forward discount can be expressed as the sum of the forecast
errors (Et½Stþk  Stþk), ex-post depreciations ðDStþkÞ, and the risk premium ðrptÞ.
Most of the literature has found that the forward discount is not equal (on
average) to the observed exchange rate change. For example, Fama (1984) and
Hodrick and Srivastava (1984) assume that expectations are rational and give
prominence to a risk premium in their explanation. The authors argue that the
variance of the risk premium is greater than the variance of the expected
depreciation. Similarly, Dominguez and Frankel (1993) show that, for imperfect















2003 (Oct–Dec) 7.8 -11.6 17.4 2.0 5.8
2004 6.3 -12.8 19.9 -0.8 7.1
2005 3.2 1.6 5.0 -3.5 6.6
2006 1.2 -12.6 15.2 -1.4 2.7
2007 3.2 -6.2 12.2 -2.9 6.1
2008 5.5 10.9 -5.7 0.3 5.1
2009 4.7 -13.4 16.5 1.7 3.0
2010 2.0 -3.3 4.8 0.5 1.5
2011 1.1 0.0 -0.5 3.0 -1.9
2012 (Jan–Aug) 3.2 0.0 -0.7 3.9 -0.7
Average 3.8 -4.9 8.4 0.3 3.5
Source: Central Bank Data and author’s calculations (mean values)
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substitutes, an increase in the amount of an asset results in either an increase in the
expected return or an increase in the risk premium.13
Intuitively, the risk premium shown in Eq. (7) can be thought of as the difference
between a risk-free investment (in this case hedged by the forward rate) and a risky
investment subject to unexpected exchange rate changes. Thus, in the case of risk-
neutral agents, the market forward rate would equal the return’s expected value,
eliminating the risk premium. If agents are risk averse, the risk premium would take
on positive values to compensate for the increased uncertainty of the risky asset.
Figure 6 depicts both the forward and expected exchange rates and shows that the
1-month forward rate follows the expected rate closely (unlike the case for the
1-year expected rate). The figure also shows that in periods of exchange rate
appreciation, the 1-year forward rate is lower than the expected rate, suggesting the
existence of a negative risk premium (and vice versa for depreciations).
Similarly, Tables 7 and 8 report the individual components of Eq. (7) for both
1-month and 1-year ahead forecasts. Table 7 shows that the difference between the
forward discount and the observed exchange rate change is relatively small for
1-month forecasts (with an average value of 0.5 % and a maximum of 1.6 % in
2004). Alternatively, Table 8 shows that this difference is large for 1-year forecasts
(with an average of 8.7 % and a maximum value of 19.4 % in 2003). It also shows
that 1-year forecast errors are large (average of 8.4 % and a maximum value of
19.9 % in 2004).
3.3 The risk premium and the rational expectations hypothesis
The use of forward rates to predict future spot exchange rates is based on the EMH,
which precludes high above-normal profits through arbitrage in the forward market.
This in turn encompasses the following joint hypothesis: (1) that expectations are
formed rationally, and (2) that market participants are risk neutral. In sum, the
efficient market hypothesis can fail as a result of non-rational expectations, or the
existence of a time-varying risk premium, or both [see Hodrick (1987) and Engel
(1996)].
Frenkel (1976) was one of the pioneers to test for the unbiasedness of forward
rates as predictors of future exchange rates (both variables measured in levels).
However, the non-stationarity properties of these variables presented a potential
spurious regression problem, which was later addressed by Garbers (1987), Crowder
(1994), Baillie et al. (1996), and Maynard and Phillips (2001).14
The conventional methodology for testing the existence of a risk premium, as
proposed by Fama (1984), is to use ex-post exchange rates as a proxy for exchange
rate expectations. The critical disadvantage to this approach is that it assumes
13 Some of the earliest empirical findings that reject the unbiasedness of forward rates (as predictors of
future spot exchange rates) include those of Levich (1979), Hansen and Hodrick (1980), Bilson (1980),
Hsieh (1983), Hansen and Hodrick (1983), and Hodrick and Srivastava (1986).
14 Some authors, like Kaminsky and Peruga (1990) and Baillie et al. (1996), include an unobservable risk
premium in their models to account for differences in statistical properties when regressing return spreads
on exchange rate changes.
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Fig. 6 Forward vs. expected exchange rates
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rational expectations instead of testing them. Thus, it is impossible to determine
whether evidence of a risk premium is in fact attributed to a time-varying risk or to
the failure of rational expectations. Assuming that our survey data accurately
represent agents’ expectations, we can directly test for the presence of a risk
premium without making any ad hoc assumptions on rationality. Hence, to
statistically test if the forward rate is an unbiased predictor of the expected exchange
rate, we estimate equation (8) as proposed by MacDonald and Torrance (1990),
Frankel and Froot (1989) and Frankel and Froot (1990a):







cjDyear þ ai þ it; ð8Þ





j cjDyear þ ai þ it
Coefficient/test k = 1 month k = 1 year
First differences Fixed effects First differences Fixed effects
b0 0.00 (0.003) -0.01*** (0.001) -0.00 (0.003) 0.03*** (0.005)
b1 0.95*** (0.047) 1.07***(0.041) 0.39*** (0.035) 0.46*** (0.034)
b2 0.00 (0.003) 0.00 (0.002) 0.00 (0.005) 0.00 (0.005)
t : b1 ¼ 1 1.30 (0.257) 2.96* (0.089) 294*** (0.000) 251*** (0.000)
Wald : b0 ¼ 0b1 ¼ 1 1.14 (0.324) 36.9*** (0.000) 150*** (0.000) 126*** (0.000)
Observations 3611 4100 2869 3443
Source: authors’ calculations. b2 corresponds to the inverse mills ratio, kðÞ, estimated from the Attrition
Probit Regression (see Table 3). All estimations were conducted with clustered standard errors,reported in
parenthesis. P values are reported only for the t test and Wald test (last two rows). Coefficients for time
dummies are not reported.The Hausman test, conducted for all regressions, rejects the null hypothesis in
which the unobserved time-invariant component is uncorrelated with the model’s covariates
***, **, * correspond to significance levels of 1, 5 and 10 %, respectively





j cjDyear þ ai þ it
Coefficient/test k = 1 Month k = 1 Year
First differences Fixed effects First differences Fixed effects
b0 0.00 (0.001) -0.00*** (0.001) -0.00 (0.003) 0.07*** (0.005)
b1 0.30*** (0.011) 0.27*** (0.011) 0.26*** (0.022) 0.12*** (0.018)
b2 0.00 (0.003) 0.00 (0.002) 0.00 (0.005) 0.00 (0.005)
t : b1 ¼ 1 3703*** (0.000) 4750*** (0.000) 1118*** (0.000) 2509*** (0.000)
Wald : b0 ¼ 0b1 ¼ 1 1857*** (0.000) 2786*** (0.000) 564*** (0.000) 2053*** (0.000)
Observations 3611 4100 2869 3443
Source: authors’ calculations. b2 corresponds to the inverse mills ratio, kðÞ, estimated from the attrition
probit regression (see Table 3). All estimations were conducted with clustered standard errors, reported in
parenthesis. P values are reported only for the t test and Wald test (last two rows). Coefficients for time
dummies are not reported. The Hausman test, conducted for all regressions, rejects the null hypothesis in
which the unobserved time-invariant component is uncorrelated with the model’s covariates
***, **, * correspond to significance levels of 1, 5 and 10 %, respectively
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where the expected future exchange rate, Et½Si;tþk, is obtained from the central
bank’s survey, and Ftþkt  St corresponds to the forward discount. In this panel
setting, ‘‘i00 corresponds to cross-sectional dimension. A constant is also added to
account for the convexity term arising from Jensen’s inequality.15
Table 4 presents the estimated coefficients, a t test for the null hypothesis
H0 : b1 ¼ 1, and a Wald test for the joint hypothesis b0 ¼ 0 and b1 ¼ 1. Results are
reported using both First Differences and Fixed Effects with clustered standard
errors (reported in parenthesis). The Hausman test, conducted for all regressions,
rejects the null hypothesis in which the unobserved time-invariant component ðaiÞ is
uncorrelated with the model’s covariates.
Results are similar for all specifications considered. The null H0 : b1 ¼ 1 and
H0 : b0 ¼ 0 \ b1 ¼ 1 are rejected for all horizons except for 1-month forecasts
using first differences. These results are somewhat different to those found by
Frankel and Froot (1989) who reject the null for 1-month forecasts, but do not reject
the null for 3-month, 6-month and 1-year horizons.16
In addition to the presence of a risk premium, it is of interest to test for rational
expectations so as to validate (or not) the use of ex-post exchange rates as proxies of
exchange rate expectations. Recall that to determine if expectations are rational they
must: (1) be unbiased predictors of the ex-post future exchange rate (unbiasedness),
and (2) contain all useful information available at the time when they are formed
(orthogonality). Although the first result alone would be sufficient to reject rational
expectations, we also test for the orthogonally condition to shed additional light on
whether expectations capture the impact of news and some selected fundamentals.
Table 9 presents estimations for the unbiasedness condition as proposed by Allen
and Taylor (1990), Frankel and Froot (1990b) and MacDonald and Torrance (1990).
Results show that the joint hypothesis b0 ¼ 0 \ b1 ¼ 1 is rejected for all cases. We
also estimate the effects of average forecasts on future exchange rate changes to avoid
a potential endogeneity problem (i.e., when using ex-post values of the exchange rate
as covariates). Table 5 shows that the null H0 : b1 ¼ 1 is also rejected for all horizons.
Regarding the orthogonality condition, if agents use all available information, then
any covariate shouldbeorthogonal to the forecast error.Dominguez (1986),MacDonald
and Torrance (1990) and Benassy-Quere et al. (2003) find that rejection of the null
hardly ever occurs at 1-week and 2-weekhorizons. Rejection of the null ismore frequent
at the 1-month horizon, and becomes strongest when considering horizons larger than 3
months. At 1-year horizons, rejection becomes an empirical regularity.
We considered four key fundamentals to regress (individually) against agent’s
forecast errors, consisting of: meeting dates of the central bank’s board of directors,
changes in the announced policy rate, the forward discount, and past exchange rate
changes. Results are reported in Table 10 and show that all variables had a
significant impact over the 1-month forecast errors or the 1-year forecast errors.
Consistently, the last row (F test) shows that all specifications reject the null that
states that all coefficients are equal to zero.
15 See MacDonald and Torrance (1990).
16 Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) were also considered (not reported) to allow for cross-
equation contemporaneous correlations, yielding very similar results.
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To our surprise, these results suggest that agents (on average) could have
improved their forecasting accuracy by accounting for variation found in the
forward discount, past exchange rate changes, policy meetings, or the policy rate.
We note that the negative coefficient of past exchange rate changes for the 1-month
horizon implies that in the short run, a depreciation leads to a systematic under-
prediction of the exchange rate (opposite to 1-year horizons).
4 Stabilizing–destabilizing expectations
Many models of exchange rate determination have made the simplifying assumption
that expectations are static. In other words that expected depreciations are zero, or that
the exchange rate follows a randomwalk.Advocates of this assumption, such asMeese
and Rogoff (1983), show that a random walk performs as well as any other model for
horizons of 1 month to 12 -months, for a series of exchange rates. Other supporters
claim that floating exchange rates are highly unstable. For Nurkse (1944) (pp. 118):
‘‘[Speculative] anticipations are apt to bring about their own realization.
Anticipatory purchases of foreign exchange tend to produce or at any rate to
hasten the anticipated fall in the exchange value of the national currency, and
the actual fall may set up or strengthen expectations of a further fall ...
Exchange rates under such circumstances are bound to become highly
unstable, and the influence of psychological factors may at times be
overwhelming’’
Contrary to this strand of literature, Friedman (1953) advocacy for floating
exchange rates was based on the stabilizing effect of expectations, that is, if current
or past appreciations of domestic currency induce agents to expect future
depreciations, then they will seek to sell domestic currency, and hence, mitigate
much of the current appreciation.





j cjDyear þ t
Coefficient/test k = 1 month k = 1 year
First differences Fixed effects First differences Fixed effects
b0 0.01*** (0.001) -0.01*** (0.001) -0.01*** (0.001) -0.14*** (0.004)
b1 0.72*** (0.036) 0.68*** (0.028) 0.24*** (0.040) 0.32*** (0.058)
b2 0.00 (0.003) 0.00 (0.003) 0.00 (0.005) 0.00 (0.006)
t : b1 ¼ 1 57.4*** (0.000) 144*** (0.000) 363*** (0.000) 134*** (0.000)
Wald : b0 ¼ 0b1 ¼ 1 41.7*** (0.000) 96.7*** (0.000) 205*** (0.000) 2801*** (0.000)
Observations 3611 4100 2869 3443
Source: authors’ calculations. b2 corresponds to the inverse mills ratio, kðÞ, estimated from the Attrition
Probit Regression (see Table 3). All estimations were conducted with clustered standard errors, reported
in parenthesis. P values are reported only for the t test and Wald test (last two rows). Coefficients for time
dummies are not reported. The Hausman test, conducted for all regressions, rejects the null hypothesis in
which the unobserved time-invariant component is uncorrelated with the model’s covariates
***, **, * correspond to significance levels of 1, 5 and 10 %, respectively
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Following Frankel and Froot (1986), Takagi (1991) and Frankel and Rose (1994),
we consider three main processes of expectation formation to compare the
forecasting accuracy of each, as well as to shed some light on the stabilizing or
destabilizing effect that they might have over the short- and long-term exchange
rate. The discussion is based on the general form of equation (9):
Et½Stþk ¼ bxt þ ð1 bÞSt; ð9Þ
where xt again is comprised of variables from investors’ information set. Expec-
tations can thus be seen as the weighted average of the contemporaneous spot rate
and some other variable at time t. In the literature, there are three main candidates
for xt: past exchange rates, past expected exchange rates, and long-term equilibrium
values of the exchange rate. They correspond to extrapolative, adaptive, and
regressive expectations, respectively. By substituting these candidates in Eq. (9), we
obtain Eqs. (10)–(12):
Et½Stþk  St ¼ bexðSt  StkÞ ð10Þ
Et½Stþk  St ¼ badðSt  Etk½StÞ ð11Þ
Et½Stþk  St ¼ bregðSt  StÞ; ð12Þ
where as a proxy for the long-run equilibrium exchange rate ð StÞ, we use the mean
of 7 (in house) models estimated by the Colombian Central Bank.17
Table 10 Orthogonality condition: Et½Si;tþk  Stþk ¼ x0itbþ
P
j cjDyear þ ai þ it
Coefficient/test k = 1 month k = 1 year





0.15*** (0.034) -0.02 (0.026)











0.30*** (0.013) -0.06 (0.013) 0.13*** (0.033) 0.37*** (0.048)
Ftest : All bs ¼ 0 201*** (0.000) 97.7*** (0.000) 8.33*** (0.000) 31.1*** (0.000)
Observations 3575 4063 2513 3055
Source: authors’ calculations. All estimations were conducted with clustered standard errors, reported in
parenthesis. P values are reported only for the F test (last row). The Hausman test, conducted for all
regressions, rejects the null hypothesis in which the unobserved time-invariant component is uncorrelated
with the model’s covariates
***, **, * correspond to significance levels of 1, 5 and 10 %, respectively. Coefficients for time dummies
are not reported
17 Two of these models are based on the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) condition, 2 are based on Vector
Error Correction (VEC) methodologies and one model uses a Hodrick and Prescott filter.
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In sum, extrapolative expectations involve forecasting with past movements of
the exchange rate (past variations are used to forecast the next period’s variation).
Under adaptive expectations, investors use current forecast errors to predict future
exchange rates. Intuitively, if an agent expects the exchange rate to be higher than
what is observed ex-post, then she will ‘‘correct’’ her new forecast by lessening her
expectation of the next period’s exchange rate change (expectations adapt to new
changes given past mistakes). Finally, regressive expectations incorporate devia-
tions of the exchange rate with respect to a long-run equilibrium value. This process
assumes that the exchange rate ‘‘regresses’’ (at speed breg) towards a long-run value
which can take the form of a constant, moving average, or purchasing power parity,
among others [see Dornbusch (1976)].
The processes described in Eqs. (10–12) are stabilizing when agents believe that
a large appreciation (depreciation) in the past will be followed by a smaller
depreciation (appreciation) in the future. In other words, when the coefficients of
bex, bad, and breg are negative and less than unity (in absolute terms). The alternative
hypothesis of static expectations (i.e., random walk) will occur when coefficients are
zero. In the literature, Frankel and Froot (1990a) and Cavaglia et al. (1993) find
positive values for bex, bad, and breg when considering 1-month horizons, suggesting
that short run expectations carry bandwagon or destabilizing effects. However, for
horizons longer or equal than 3 months, the authors find stabilizing effects.
Table 11 presents results for Eqs. (10)–(12), estimated in a panel data setup. They
show that expectations are stabilizing in all cases, with negative coefficients
between (-1, 0), except for the case of regressive expectations at the 1-year horizon
which shows a positive coefficient of less than unity. These results are partially
related to the ‘‘Twist’’ in expectations presented in Fig. 2. They are also consistent
with Villa (2011) who finds that expectations are stabilizing for nearly 85 % of
cases when considering extrapolative and adaptive expectations, and for more than
95 % when considering regressive expectations.
4.1 The random walk benchmark
There is an ample literature on the unpredictability of exchange rates, in which
studies often compare the accuracy of linear models with a benchmark random walk
process. Most of these studies have generally followed the methodology presented
in the seminal work of Meese and Rogoff (1983) but some earlier works include
those of Nelson (1972), Christ (1975), Litterman (1979) and Fair (1979).
To date, most studies have failed to reject the null hypothesis that exchange rates
are unpredictable. However, some exceptions are found in the literature. Evans and
Lyons (2005), for example, use order flows as a successful determinant of future
exchange rates. Cheung et al. (2005) find that models that incorporate productivity
differentials outperform the random walk benchmark for some periods and
currencies. Gourinchas and Rey (2005) are also able to outperform a random walk
with a model that uses the trade balance and the valuation of net foreign assets.18
18 Studies that find predictable models for stock market returns are more abundant, and include Keim and
Stambaugh (1986), Fama and French (1988) and Lo and MacKinlay (1987).
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Following the classic paper of Meese and Rogoff (1983) and a more recent paper
like Rogoff (2009), in this section we set forth five competing models to assess how
well they perform relative to a random walk. In the methodology that follows, we
constructed Mean Squared Prediction Errors (MSPEs) for each model as well as for








where ð^Þ corresponds to the estimated value of the forecast error ðE½Stþk  StÞ,
and ‘‘N 00 corresponds to the number of rolled-over forecast periods.
When conducting inference for nested models, it is important to control for an
existing upward shift of the predicted sample errors. We account for this by
following the methodology in the study by Clark and West (2006), that is, we
construct MSPE-adjusted statistics in which, under the null hypothesis that models
follow a martingale difference, the sample MSPE can be equal to that of the null.19
We thus proceed as follows: first we define our in-sample period to be from Oct
2003 to May 2005. We then estimate the corresponding models and make 1-period
out of sample forecasts before rolling over the sample by one period. Finally, we
construct MSPE-adjusted statistic for each model.
Results are presented in Table 12. The first column shows the different
competing models (i.e., unrestricted models) that consist of extrapolative, adaptive,
and regressive processes (described in the previous section), the forward discount
ðFtþkt  StÞ, and expected depreciations ðEt½Stþk  StÞ from the central bank’s
survey. We considered expectations from all participants but also individually
categorized commercial banks, stockbrokers and pension funds in rows: 7–9.
Columns 2 and 3 show results for the ðMSPEr  MSPEuÞ-adjusted statistic, using
the methodology presented by Clark and West (2006). Hence, positive values
indicate good predictors of the exchange rate, since they outperform a random walk
(i.e., lower MSPEs than that of a random walk).
Table 11 (De)-stabilizing expectations
Type of expectation k = 1 Month k = 1 Year
Extrapolative Et½DSi;tþk ¼ b0 þ b1DSt þ it b1 ¼ -0.03** (0.013) b1 ¼ -0.13*** (0.015)
Adaptive Et½DSi;tþk ¼ a0 þ a1ðSt  Etk½SitÞ þ mit a1 ¼ -0.05*** (0.016) a1 ¼ -0.15*** (0.017)
Regressive Et½DSi;tþk ¼ c0 þ c1ðSt  StÞ þ git c1 ¼ -0.05*** (0.005) c1 ¼ 0.11*** (0.029)
Source: Authors’ calculations. All estimations correspond to PANEL regressions with fixed effects and
robust clustered standard errors, reported in parenthesis. Total number of observations: 4,100 for 1-month
horizon and 3,478 for 1-year horizon
***, **, * correspond to significance levels of 1, 5 and 10 %, respectively
19 See the studies by Granger and Newbold (1977) and Ashley et al. (1980) for a list of methods that
compare MSPEs. Other studies such as Meese and Rogoff (1988), Christiano (1989), West et al. (1993),
and Diebold and Mariano (1995) offer more general forecast evaluation procedures.
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Results for 1-month forecasts show that expectations stated in the survey
outperform the three models of extrapolative, adaptive or regressive expectations,
and also the forward discount. In fact, they outperform the random walk, with
positive and significant numbers for ðMSPEr MSPEuÞ. But results are almost the
opposite for 1-year forecasts in which the statistic ðMSPEr MSPEuÞ is not
significant for agent’s forecasts (rows 6–9), but is significant for the case of
extrapolative, adaptive, and regressive expectations, and even the forward discount.
In sum, this exercise suggests that agents do exceptionally well in forecasting
1-month horizons but should reconsider their 1-year forecasts, that is, by following
models presented in rows 1–4, agents can improve their forecasting accuracy.
We note that the employed loss function (MSPE) is explicitly symmetric. In other
words, forecasts suffer the same loss independent of the sign of the error. To shed
some light on this issue, we considered negative and positive forecast errors
separately. Results are shown in Table 13 of Appendix A and show similar results,
except for the case of regressive expectations (1-month forecasts are no longer
significant) and the forward discount (1-year forecasts are no longer significant).
5 Conclusion
Exchange rate expectations play a key role in determining economic variables and,
according to some authors like Woodford and Walsh (2005), ‘‘little else matter’’.
However, there is wide disagreement on the behavior of exchange rate expectations,
with various implications for economic policy.
Following the practice pioneered by Dominguez (1986), Frankel (1979), and
Frankel and Froot (1987), in this paper we use the largest exchange rate survey in
Colombia to test for the rational expectations hypothesis, the presence of a time-
varying risk premium and the accuracy of exchange rate forecasts. Our main
findings indicate that episodes of exchange rate appreciation preceded expectations
Table 12 Out-of-sample forecasts: competing models vs. random walk
Model 1-Month MSPEr MSPEuð Þ 1-Year MSPEr MSPEuð Þ
Extrapolative -0.0006 (0.001) 0.18*** (0.042)
Adaptive -0.0004 (0.001) 0.20*** (0.045)
Regressive 0.003*** (0.001) 0.09*** (0.030)
Forward discount 0.003** (0.002) 0.03** (0.016)
Surveyed expectations
All participants 0.009*** (0.002) 0.01 (0.013)
Commercial banks 0.009*** (0.002) 0.01 (0.015)
Stockbrokers 0.009*** (0.002) 0.01 (0.012)
Pension funds 0.009*** (0.003) 0.00 (0.018)
Source: Authors’ calculations. All estimations correspond to rolling regressions. MSPEr and MESPEu
correspond to ‘‘restricted’’ (Random walk) and ‘‘unrestricted’’ (competing strategies) models. Method-
ology follows that of Clark and West (2006). Standard errors are in parenthesis
***, **, * correspond to significance levels of 1, 5 and 10 %, respectively
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of further appreciation in the short run, but were marked by depreciations in the long
run. Additionally, we find that the forward discount differed from future exchange
rate changes due to the rejection of the unbiasedness condition and to the presence
of a time-varying risk premium.
Finally, we set forth five competing strategies to assess how well actual
expectations performed relative to a random walk process. We find that 1-month
expectations outperform models of extrapolative, adaptive or regressive expecta-
tions and even a random walk process (with lower mean squared prediction errors).
But results are almost the opposite for 1-year forecasts, where expectations do not
outperform a random walk. In this last case, traders and analysts answering the
survey could have improved their forecasts by incorporating information from the
forward discount, past exchange rate changes, policy meetings, or the policy rate.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, dis-
tribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original
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